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WE SEE TWO CLUSTERS of questions aris-ing out of the papers in this issue. Thefirst cluster concerns the role of expe-
rience in the explanation of delusions: Do abnor-
mal experiences play a central role in accounting
for delusions, or are they at best only marginal?
And if experience plays a central role in account-
ing for delusions, exactly what role does it play?
The second cluster of questions concerns the
interpretability of delusions: Are delusional ut-
terances meaningful, or are they mere noises?
And if they are meaningful, what makes it the
case that they are meaningful?
Empiricism and Rationalism
In our target paper (Bayne and Pacherie 2004)
we followed Campbell in distinguishing empiri-
cist (bottom-up) accounts of delusions from ra-
tionalist (top-down) accounts. An account is em-
piricist if it grounds the delusion in an abnormal
experience of some kind; it is rationalist if it
refuses to ground the delusion in an abnormal
experience. On our reading of the literature, most
recent accounts of delusions—particularly mono-
thematic delusions—are broadly empiricist (for
reviews see Langdon and Coltheart 2000; Davies
et al. 2001). We took Campbell to be running
against the current wave of empiricist enthusi-
asm in defending a version of rationalism ac-
cording to which delusions arise directly from
organic malfunction: according to Campbell, the
abnormal experiences of delusional patients ought
to be explained in terms of their delusional be-
liefs rather than vice versa. In response, we ar-
gued that there is much to be said in favor of
empiricist enthusiasm, at least with respect to
certain monothematic delusions. (There would
seem to be little prospect of giving an empiricist
analysis of the delusion of believing that one’s
left ear is a second fertile womb, for example.)
A number of the contributors to this issue are
less enamored with the empiricist approach. Ho-
hwy (2004) suggests that plausible models of
delusions should be both top-down and bottom-
up, and Broome (2004) claims that most con-
temporary models of delusion concur with Camp-
bell’s rejection of empiricism. Both Hohwy and
Broome cite Frith’s model of delusions of alien
control as a nonempiricist model, although they
present different accounts of how it is nonempir-
icist. Should we rethink our commitment to em-
piricism?
We think not. We suggest that our critics have
misunderstood what we meant by top-down and
bottom-up. In fact, we think that there is a lot of
miscommunication in this debate. So the first
order of business is to get clear on the terminology.
Begin by noting that a bottom-up approach is
bottom-up from experience. Bottom-uppers need
not—and in fact do not—claim that cognitive
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biases and background beliefs play no role in the
genesis of delusions. Cognitive biases can exert
their influence in one (or both) of two ways:
either preperceptually (by influencing experien-
tial content), or postperceptually (by influencing
the beliefs that the patient forms on the basis of
their experiences). Both preperceptual and post-
perceptual influences are perfectly consistent with
the empiricist view that the beliefs in question
have their primary ground in abnormal experi-
ences.
There are two ways in which empiricist (bot-
tom-up) accounts of delusions can proceed (see
Davies et al. 2001). According to what we called
the endorsement version of empiricism, the per-
son experiences that P and comes to believe that
P. By contrast, explanationist versions of empiri-
cism hold that the person simply has a strange
experience, and comes to believe that P in an
attempt to make sense of this experience. Both
models are empiricist in that they hold the pri-
mary ground of the delusion to be an abnormal
experience of some kind, but only proponents of
the endorsement model identify the content of
this abnormal experience with the content of the
patient’s delusion.
The distinction between endorsement and ex-
planationist models is orthogonal to the distinc-
tion between one-factor and two-factor versions
of empiricism (see Davies et al. 2001). One-
factor versions of empiricism, such as Maher’s
(1999), hold that the only impairments delusion-
al patients have are perceptual: their belief-fixa-
tion processes—that is, those processes that take
perceptual states as input and generate doxastic
states as output—operate within the normal
range. Two-factor accounts, by contrast, hold
that delusional patients have abnormal belief-
fixation processes. It is a mistake to think that
endorsement models just are, or must be devel-
oped in terms of, one-factor accounts (as Ger-
rans 2003, 50 seems to). An endorsement model
can be developed in two-factor terms: normal
individuals are able to inhibit the prepotent re-
sponse of believing what they perceive (think, for
instance, of the Müller—Lyer illusion.) Perhaps
some delusional patients have deficits in the inhi-
bition of this prepotent response. And explana-
tionist models are compatible with both one-
factor and two-factor accounts. Whether or not
the explanationist needs to invoke a belief-fixa-
tion abnormality depends on whether she thinks
that a normal individual would form (and main-
tain) the sorts of explanations of their unusual
experiences that delusional patients do.
Does our distinction between empiricist and
rationalist accounts map onto Klee’s distinction
between one-stage and two-stage accounts? Prob-
ably not. According to Klee, a one-stager holds
“that raw perceptual experience contains its own
intrinsic thematic content,” whereas the two-
stager holds that “thematic content is always
supplied by a distinct stage of cognitive interpre-
tation” (2004, 26). Klee might appear to be say-
ing that a two-stage model holds that perceptual
states lack representational content, but we sus-
pect that that is not his view. (Although Klee
does suggest that Davidson is a two-stager, and
Davidson denies that perception has representa-
tional content.) Rather, Klee’s two-stager seems
to hold that perception inherits its representa-
tional content from the “belief-desire system.”
Although we are not entirely sure what it would
be for a perceptual state to inherit its content
from a belief-desire system, as far as we can tell
this view is consistent with both empiricist and
rationalist accounts of delusion formation, as we
(following Campbell) are using those terms.1
So much for taxonomic clarification: let us
return to the question of whether current models
of delusion are typically empiricist or rationalist
by focusing on Frith’s model of alien control.
Broome suggests that Frith’s model is a top-
down model, whereas Hohwy describes it as a
mixed model. Although there might be certain
uses of bottom-up and top-down on which these
descriptions are correct, we think that Frith’s
model is pretty clearly a bottom-up model on
our use of the term. Frith attempts to explain
delusions of alien control in terms of the content
of the patient’s abnormal experience of agency.2
Although he has said very little about how such
patients move from these experiences to delu-
sional belief, Frith clearly assumes that they form
their delusional beliefs on the basis of these alien
experiences (perhaps in conjunction with cogni-
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tive biases of various kinds).3 This approach to
alien control is diametrically opposed to that
which a rationalist (such as Campbell) would
take. A rationalist would say that if such patients
have unusual experiences of agency, it is because
they have delusions of alien control. Whether or
not this rationalist account is plausible, it is cer-
tainly not supported by Frith’s laboratory.4
To clarify this point, consider Hohwy’s (2004)
characterization of current models of the delu-
sion of alien control. What Hohwy describes as a
top-down effect—the modulation of the experi-
ence of self-initiated movement by hypofrontali-
ty—does not look at all top-down to us, because
it plays a role in fixing experiential content. And
what Hohwy describes as bottom-up—the fact
that there is no inhibition of prepotent doxastic
response—does not look particularly bottom-up
to us. Finally, Hohwy’s discussion of predictive
coding seems to us to be grist for the empiricist
mill. As far as we can tell, predictive coding is
meant to play a role in the fixation of perceptual
content, rather than accounting for the fixation
of belief independent of perception. As such,
models that appeal to it fall squarely within the
empiricist camp.
We suspect that much of the apparent dis-
agreement between Broome (2004) and Hohwy
(2004) on the one hand and ourselves on the
other is verbal. In contrast, our disagreements
with Klee are substantive. Klee (2004) rejects
empiricist models on the grounds that they fail to
explain why the delusions in question have the
specific thematic contents that they do (p. 26).
His point seems to be not that the empiricists are
unable to explain why delusional individuals have
the abnormal experiences that they do, but that
empiricists cannot explain why delusional pa-
tients form the delusions that they do given their
unusual experiences. Why, Klee asks, does the
unusual experiential state of Cotard sufferers
lead them to form the belief that they are dead
rather than a number, a large rock, or a tub of
dirt?
As Sass (2004) points out, deadness is a condi-
tion of a person and seems a natural choice for
an individual who still has a subjective life, al-
though stripped of its emotional component, and
still experiences him- or herself as a person. There
is no particular problem integrating Sass’s expla-
nation of why the Cotard delusion has the specif-
ic thematic content into an empiricist account.
The Cotard patient retains background beliefs
about his personhood together with current sub-
jective experiences that cohere with these beliefs.
According to an endorsement empiricist account,
the Cotard patient experiences himself as dead
(or rotting, etc.) as a result of his lack of affect
and the preperceptual influence of his background
beliefs. According to an explanationist account,
the Cotard patient experiences a strange and
disturbing lack of affect, and adopts the belief
that he is dead to make some sense of this experi-
ence. This seems to be a comprehensible expla-
nation for the patient to adopt given the fact that
he is aware that he is (or at least was) a person.
Interpretation
We turn now to questions of meaning and
interpretation. Are delusional states interpret-
able? Can we bring delusional patients within
the interpretive fold? There is much to be said
here, but due to space constraints our comments
will be programmatic.
There are three main tenets of Davidsonian
interpretationism (Davidson 1975, 1994):
(1)Rationality is constitutive of intelligibility: to
explain behavior is to locate it in a wider net-
work of cognitive states and activities connect-
ed according to norms of procedural rationality.
(2)Rationality is constitutive of meaning: what gives
a state its content is its place in a network of
rationally connected propositional attitudes.
(3)Beliefs can be justified only by other beliefs.
For Davidson, claims (1) and (2) are but the
two faces of the same coin. In contrast, Klee
(2004) sees them as dissociable. He argues against
(2) but wants to keep (1). Against (2), Klee claims
that because clinicians usually have little trouble
identifying the content of even stark delusions,
rationality cannot be constitutive of mental con-
tent. Yet, he maintains that despite having under-
standable content, stark delusions are neverthe-
less necessarily inexplicable.
On our reading, Klee’s argument against (2) is
partly based on (1) and (3). Beliefs are explained
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by their rational relations to other beliefs, but
stark delusions cannot be located in such a net-
work of relations; they do not cohere with other
things that the deluded subject believes aright.
Here, Klee seems to endorse Davidson’s stric-
tures on what kinds of relations (rational in what
Gerrans would call the procedural sense) and
relata (beliefs and only beliefs) can be appealed
to in accounting for intelligibility.
We do not think that these strictures are justi-
fied. We reject (3) and think that (1) and (2) are
acceptable only if suitably modified such that: (i)
the relata that fix intelligibility and content also
include nonpropositional attitudes (such as ex-
periences); (ii) intelligibility and content are de-
termined not just by norms of procedural ratio-
nality but also by other principles of inference
and cognitive biases; and (iii) intelligibility and
content are not fixed in a globally holistic man-
ner. Let us explore these three points briefly.
Despite its fame, the Davidsonian claim that
only beliefs can provide reasons is false. The
perception as of a tree in front of one gives one a
reason to believe that there is a tree in front of
one. This reason is defeasible, of course, but it is
a reason nonetheless (Pollock 1986). And what-
ever exactly the best account of mental state
ascription turns out to be, it is exceedingly plau-
sible that it will give an important role to experi-
ential states (perceptual states, emotional states,
etc.).
Why has experience been neglected in accounts
of interpretation? One reason is the widespread
assumption, shared by Davidson, that experien-
tial states lack representational content. Another
reason, pointed out by Gerrans (2004), is that
Davidson equates norms of rational belief fixa-
tion with norms of procedural rationality (the
familiar principles of inference as found in de-
ductive logic and probability theory). The equa-
tion is dubious when restricted to its home
ground—that is, when conceived of as an ac-
count of the fixation of belief on the basis of
prior belief—but it is even more problematic
when applied to the fixation of belief on the
basis of experience.
Klee’s second reason for declaring stark delu-
sions necessarily inexplicable is, he claims, Wit-
tgensteinian. A stark delusion, Klee suggests, in-
volves content that negates what stands fast for
us. Here Klee seems to assume that we are all
prisoners of a unique, shared language game or
world view, and that anyone who steps out of its
bounds thereby becomes unintelligible. This as-
sumption is unwarranted. As Wittgenstein him-
self says, “the same proposition may get treated
at one time as something to test by experience, at
another as a rule of testing” (1969, §98). We
participate in various language games, and what
stands fast—framework propositions—varies
from game to game. To take just one example,
the rules that philosophers and scientists adhere
to in their professional lives often differ from
those they adhere to in their everyday lives.5
It may well be that if someone does not abide
by the rules of a certain game—if he negates that
which stands fast within it—his utterances will
not be explicable as moves in that game. But it
does not follow that they are necessarily inexpli-
cable, for they may well make sense in the con-
text of another language game. And to spin out
the metaphor, stark delusions may be telltale
signs that a different language game is being
played, one whose rules might be discernable. In
the same way that the student of philosophy or
quantum physics gradually uncovers the rules of
the games they are learning, psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists might be able to uncover
the rules by which their delusional patients abide.
Eugenie Georgaca’s (2004) analysis of a dialogue
between a clinician and a delusional patient pro-
vides a useful example of one way this can be
done.
Moreover, as Sass and Broome point out, lan-
guage games can overlap and interpenetrate in
various ways (Sass 2004, 73; Broome 2004, 39).
Although we may have failed to convey this in
our target paper, we concur with Sass in thinking
that an interpretation of a delusion need not
“preserve the conventional meanings of a word
in what would seem a rather exact or rigid way”
(2004, 73). Sass’s discussion reminds us that the
semantics of a word may reflect the fact that it is
part of several intersecting language games (for
death, the language games would include biolo-
gy, the subjective realm of consciousness, reli-
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gious beliefs concerning life after death, super-
natural entities, etc.). In his use of words, a
delusional patient may break the rules governing
one of these intersecting language games while
retaining the meanings these words have in other
language games.
In our opinion, Davidsonian interpretation-
ism overstates the uniformity and homogeneity
of our network of cognitive states conceived of
as beliefs held together by rational relations. And
the use Klee makes of Wittgensteinian ideas seems
to skew them in the direction of Davidsonian
uniformity. Wittgenstein, however, insisted that
the foundational status of beliefs is relative to a
given language game, and we participate in a
variety of language games.6 The problem with
homogeneous cognitive networks is that they are
brittle: intelligibility is easily jeopardized when
only one kind of relation holds states together.
Understanding and intelligibility are more resil-
ient in heterogeneous cognitive networks that
involve a number of overlapping language games
and a plurality of representational states. Taking
into account the role played by experience—in
particular, the role played by “certain formal or
structural aspects or pervasive infrastructures of
experience” (Sass 2004, 75)—allows us to make
(partial) sense of delusions that the Davidsonian
is forced to place outside the interpretive fold.
The empiricist approach attempts to bring the
patient within the interpretative fold by broad-
ening the range of possible personal-level expla-
nations to include not just propositional states
but experiences, such as moods, emotions, and
perceptual states. The thought is that we can  get
a grip on what the patient believes—and why
they believe what they believe—by having a great-
er appreciation of the contents of his experience.
In this regard, the empiricist approach traffics in
personal-level explanations: personal level phe-
nomena—delusional beliefs—are explained in
terms of other personal-level phenomena—expe-
riential states. But, as Gerrans (2004) and Ghaemi
(2004) remind us, empiricist approaches can also
be supplemented by subpersonal explanations.
Subpersonal accounts can be invoked to explain
(i) why the person had the experiences they did
and (ii) why they went on to form the beliefs that
they did in response to those experiences. These
accounts will be, at least in part, pitched at the
systemic level, the biological level, or both.
Notes
1. Klee goes on to say that some of Wittgenstein’s
holist views call into question the coherency of one-
stage models of any kind of belief-state (p. 28). How
does that argument go? We’re not sure. Klee says that
beliefs are born networked together in complex rela-
tions of support and counter-support. That might be
true—but we cannot see what that claim has to do with
the question of whether or not perceptual states have
their own (“raw”) content.
2. It is not clear whether Frith’s approach is an
endorsement or an explanationist one. Klee presents
him as an explanationist, but on occasions Frith ap-
pears to think that the experience underlying delusions
of alien control has roughly the content of the delu-
sional state itself. Frith—like most empiricists—has
not been particularly clear on what he thinks the con-
tents of the experiences underlying the delusion of
alien control are.
3. One may still suspect, as Klee does, that Frith’s
model does not explain why an anomalous experiences
of agency due to defective predictive coding gives rise to
delusions of alien control. But see Jeannerod and Pach-
erie (2004) for a way of supplementing Frith’s account.
4. Although we lack the space to make this point
here, we think that much the same goes for other
models of delusion that Broome mentions. The models
appeal to biases of various kinds, but they see these
biases as operating on, or in conjunction with, abnor-
mal experiences of some kind. In short, they are empir-
icist models in our sense of the word.
5. Similarly, as Sass notes (p. 74), many practically
minded and even scientifically inclined persons find it
possible to believe in various religious doctrines.
6. Broome (p. 39) rightly stresses this point, but
mistakenly assumes that it favours rationalist over em-
piricist accounts. On the contrary, an advantage of the
empiricist account is that it promises to explain—in
terms of a systematic alteration of experience—the fact
that a certain proposition has a framework status for a
delusional subject.
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